security: fix full audit findings (v0.32.0)

Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes:

- Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page
  (app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting.
- CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod
  never eval()s; only its HMR does).
- avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an
  avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same
  pattern as recipe/review photos.
- No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke
  other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset).
- Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last
  (proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one,
  matching the single-Traefik-hop topology.
- Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM
  encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy-
  plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our
  ciphertext format always does).
- Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage,
  ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as
  lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase
  explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect.
- Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the
  actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota
  charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3
  presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition,
  enforced by the storage server itself.
- generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility
  filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via
  <title> to any signed-in user with the id.
- Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow.
- AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used
  (their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through
  the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also
  wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url,
  which never looked it up at all before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Arnaud
2026-07-14 15:05:05 +02:00
parent 6f11dc07fd
commit 3042d289a0
42 changed files with 508 additions and 417 deletions
+32 -5
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { S3Client, PutObjectCommand, DeleteObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
import { getSignedUrl } from "@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner";
import { S3Client, DeleteObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
import { createPresignedPost } from "@aws-sdk/s3-presigned-post";
const bucket = process.env["STORAGE_BUCKET"] || "epicure-uploads";
const endpoint = process.env["STORAGE_ENDPOINT"] || "http://localhost:9000";
@@ -32,9 +32,31 @@ const presignS3 = new S3Client({
credentials,
});
export async function createPresignedUploadUrl(key: string, contentType: string): Promise<string> {
const command = new PutObjectCommand({ Bucket: bucket, Key: key, ContentType: contentType });
return getSignedUrl(presignS3, command, { expiresIn: 300 });
/**
* A presigned PUT URL only signs Bucket/Key/ContentType — nothing binds the
* actual request body size to what the caller declared when it asked for the
* URL (and was charged storage-tier quota for), so a client could declare
* 1 byte and then PUT an arbitrarily large object. S3/MinIO's POST-policy
* upload flow is the fix: `content-length-range` is a *signed* condition,
* enforced by the storage server itself when it receives the upload — a
* mismatched Content-Length is rejected before the bytes are ever accepted,
* not just checked against something the client also controls.
*/
export async function createPresignedUploadPost(
key: string,
contentType: string,
maxBytes: number
): Promise<{ url: string; fields: Record<string, string> }> {
return createPresignedPost(presignS3, {
Bucket: bucket,
Key: key,
Conditions: [
["content-length-range", 0, maxBytes],
{ "Content-Type": contentType },
],
Fields: { "Content-Type": contentType },
Expires: 300,
});
}
export async function deleteObject(key: string): Promise<void> {
@@ -60,3 +82,8 @@ export function isOwnedRecipePhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: str
export function isOwnedReviewPhotoKey(key: string, recipeId: string, userId: string): boolean {
return key.startsWith(`recipes/${recipeId}/reviews/${userId}-`);
}
/** Same rationale as isOwnedRecipePhotoKey, for the avatar-presign key prefix. */
export function isOwnedAvatarKey(key: string, userId: string): boolean {
return key.startsWith(`user-avatars/${userId}/`);
}