fix: audit fixes — tier-quota bypass, webhook SSRF, auth hardening, pagination, a11y
Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work. Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog. - AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only - Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches - New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade - Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation - Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos) - Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure - Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota - Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root - middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches, bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id - Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables - Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions standardized on AlertDialog - Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form; canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos - packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire); openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
|
||||
const { searchParams } = new URL(req.url);
|
||||
const limit = Math.min(parseInt(searchParams.get("limit") ?? "20"), 50);
|
||||
const offsetRaw = parseInt(searchParams.get("offset") ?? "0");
|
||||
const offset = Number.isNaN(offsetRaw) ? 0 : Math.max(0, offsetRaw);
|
||||
|
||||
// Recipes the user has favorited, or rated 4+, define their taste profile.
|
||||
const [favoritedRows, highRatedRows] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
@@ -60,10 +62,12 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
? rankForYou(candidates, preferences)
|
||||
: [...candidates].sort((a, b) => b.createdAt.getTime() - a.createdAt.getTime());
|
||||
|
||||
const data = ranked.slice(0, limit).map(({ tags: _tags, dietaryTags: _dietaryTags, ...r }) => ({
|
||||
const data = ranked.slice(offset, offset + limit).map(({ tags: _tags, dietaryTags: _dietaryTags, ...r }) => ({
|
||||
...r,
|
||||
createdAt: r.createdAt.toISOString(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
return NextResponse.json({ data });
|
||||
// `ranked` is capped to a bounded recent window (see `candidates` query above), so this
|
||||
// total reflects the size of that ranked window rather than every eligible recipe.
|
||||
return NextResponse.json({ data, total: ranked.length, limit, offset });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user