fix: audit fixes — tier-quota bypass, webhook SSRF, auth hardening, pagination, a11y

Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota
bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work.
Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog.

- AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only
- Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats
  redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches
- New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade
- Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation
- Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos)
- Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure
- Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota
- Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root
- middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached
  session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches,
  bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id
- Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables
- Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions
  standardized on AlertDialog
- Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form;
  canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and
  alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos
- packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire);
  openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now
  surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/web/lib/api-auth.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,17 @@ export async function requireSession() {
 export async function requireAdmin() {
   const { session, response } = await requireSession();
   if (response) return { session: null, response };
-  if (session!.user.role !== "admin") {
+
+  // Don't trust session.user.role — it comes from a 5-minute cookieCache
+  // (see lib/auth/server.ts), so a just-demoted admin would keep access for
+  // up to 5 minutes. Query the current role directly.
+  const [dbUser] = await db
+    .select({ role: users.role })
+    .from(users)
+    .where(eq(users.id, session!.user.id))
+    .limit(1);
+
+  if (dbUser?.role !== "admin") {
     return { session: null, response: NextResponse.json({ error: "Forbidden" }, { status: 403 }) };
   }
   return { session, response: null };
@@ -72,11 +82,12 @@ export async function requireSessionOrApiKey(
           .limit(1);
 
         if (user) {
-          // Apply rate limit when requested (API key path only)
+          // Rate limit per API key (not per user — a user's other keys shouldn't
+          // share this bucket).
           if (opts?.rateLimit) {
             const { limit, windowSeconds } = opts.rateLimit;
             const rateLimitResponse = await applyRateLimit(
-              `rl:api:${user.id}`,
+              `rl:api:key:${keyRow.id}`,
               limit,
               windowSeconds
             );
@@ -100,5 +111,20 @@ export async function requireSessionOrApiKey(
   }
 
   // 2. Fall back to session cookie
-  return requireSession();
+  const result = await requireSession();
+  if (result.response) return result;
+
+  if (opts?.rateLimit) {
+    const { limit, windowSeconds } = opts.rateLimit;
+    const rateLimitResponse = await applyRateLimit(
+      `rl:api:session:${result.session!.user.id}`,
+      limit,
+      windowSeconds
+    );
+    if (rateLimitResponse) {
+      return { session: null, response: rateLimitResponse };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result;
 }