fix: close SSRF/rebinding, IDOR, and stale-session authz gaps found in audit

Bump to 0.5.1. Fixes: unfollowed-redirect SSRF + DNS-rebinding in AI
url-import and webhook dispatch (new safeFetch with IP-pinned undici
dispatcher); cross-user photo deletion via unvalidated recipe/review
storage keys; comment-moderation and tier-quota checks trusting a
stale cached session role/tier instead of the DB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Arnaud
2026-07-12 19:05:20 +02:00
parent 4f36ce24b2
commit 5a9e306357
17 changed files with 307 additions and 54 deletions
+5 -9
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import crypto from "crypto";
import { db } from "@epicure/db";
import { webhooks, webhookDeliveries } from "@epicure/db";
import { eq, and } from "@epicure/db";
import { validateWebhookUrl } from "@/lib/validate-webhook-url";
import { safeFetch } from "@/lib/validate-webhook-url";
export const WEBHOOK_EVENTS = [
"recipe.created",
@@ -31,12 +31,10 @@ export async function dispatchWebhook(userId: string, event: WebhookEvent, paylo
let statusCode = 0;
let success = false;
try {
// Re-validate at dispatch time to defeat DNS rebinding between create and
// dispatch. A small window remains between this lookup and fetch's own
// resolution of the hostname — accepted for now.
const ssrfError = await validateWebhookUrl(hook.url);
if (ssrfError) throw new Error(ssrfError);
const res = await fetch(hook.url, {
// safeFetch resolves and pins the connection to a single validated IP
// (and re-validates + re-pins every redirect hop), so there's no
// separate re-resolution for a rebinding attack to exploit.
const res = await safeFetch(hook.url, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
@@ -44,8 +42,6 @@ export async function dispatchWebhook(userId: string, event: WebhookEvent, paylo
"X-Epicure-Event": event,
},
body,
// Redirects could point at internal services, so treat 3xx as failure.
redirect: "manual",
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),
});
statusCode = res.status;