fix: close TOCTOU race + missing checks in tier limits, add AI rate limits, patch CVEs (v0.60.0)

Security audit fixes (see SECURITY_AUDIT.md):
- lib/tiers.ts: checkAndIncrementTierLimit's recipe/storage branches did a
  live count/sum check with no lock tying it to the later write, so two
  concurrent requests near the cap could both pass and both write past the
  limit. Added checkTierLimitInTransaction — holds a per-user Postgres
  advisory lock for the duration of the caller's transaction, so the check
  and the write are atomic together. Applied to every recipe/storage write
  path (recipes create/update, fork, rate, avatar, and 7 AI recipe-creation
  routes).
- Adversarial re-verification of that fix caught a bigger gap in the same
  area: four AI routes (photo import, idea generation, batch-cook,
  translate-to-new-draft) had no recipe-limit check at all. Fixed.
- Added missing per-user rate limits to 5 AI endpoints (adapt, drinks,
  pairings, translate, variations) that had none, unlike their siblings.
- search page now checks for a session server-side, matching every other
  page under (app)/ — defense in depth; the underlying API was already
  public by design and proxy.ts already blocked unauthenticated requests.
- admin/settings route now uses the shared requireAdmin instead of a local
  duplicate.
- Documented two admin support-ticket endpoints missing from the OpenAPI
  spec; verified full route/OpenAPI parity otherwise.
- Bumped drizzle-orm to fix a SQL-identifier-escaping CVE, and overrode two
  transitive deps (esbuild, postcss) with known CVEs. pnpm audit is clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/web/app/api/v1/users/me/route.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { z } from "zod";
 import { gravatarUrl } from "@/lib/gravatar";
 import { USERNAME_PATTERN, isUsernameTaken } from "@/lib/username";
 import { isOwnedAvatarKey, getPublicUrl } from "@/lib/storage";
+import { checkTierLimitInTransaction, TierLimitError } from "@/lib/tiers";
 
 const PatchSchema = z.object({
   name: z.string().min(1).max(100).optional(),
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ export async function PATCH(req: Request) {
     }
   }
 
+  let avatarSizeDeltaMb = 0;
   if (avatarKey !== undefined) {
     if (avatarKey === null) {
       const gravatarOptedIn = useGravatar ?? (await getUseGravatar(session.user.id));
@@ -62,13 +64,28 @@ export async function PATCH(req: Request) {
       if (!isOwnedAvatarKey(avatarKey, session.user.id)) {
         return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid avatar key" }, { status: 400 });
       }
+      const currentAvatarSizeMb = await getAvatarSizeMb(session.user.id);
+      avatarSizeDeltaMb = avatarSizeMb - currentAvatarSizeMb;
       updates.avatarUrl = getPublicUrl(avatarKey);
       updates.hasCustomAvatar = true;
       updates.avatarSizeMb = avatarSizeMb;
     }
   }
 
-  await db.update(users).set(updates).where(eq(users.id, session.user.id));
+  try {
+    await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+      if (avatarSizeDeltaMb > 0) {
+        await checkTierLimitInTransaction(tx, session.user.id, session.user.tier as "free" | "pro" | "family", "storage", avatarSizeDeltaMb);
+      }
+      await tx.update(users).set(updates).where(eq(users.id, session.user.id));
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof TierLimitError) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "Storage limit reached for your tier" }, { status: 403 });
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+
   return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, avatarUrl: updates.avatarUrl });
 }
 
@@ -81,3 +98,8 @@ async function getUseGravatar(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
   const row = await db.query.users.findFirst({ where: eq(users.id, userId), columns: { useGravatar: true } });
   return row?.useGravatar ?? false;
 }
+
+async function getAvatarSizeMb(userId: string): Promise<number> {
+  const row = await db.query.users.findFirst({ where: eq(users.id, userId), columns: { avatarSizeMb: true } });
+  return row?.avatarSizeMb ?? 0;
+}