Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes:
- Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page
(app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting.
- CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod
never eval()s; only its HMR does).
- avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an
avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same
pattern as recipe/review photos.
- No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke
other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset).
- Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last
(proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one,
matching the single-Traefik-hop topology.
- Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM
encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy-
plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our
ciphertext format always does).
- Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage,
ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as
lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase
explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect.
- Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the
actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota
charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3
presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition,
enforced by the storage server itself.
- generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility
filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via
<title> to any signed-in user with the id.
- Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow.
- AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used
(their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through
the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also
wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url,
which never looked it up at all before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
script-src had no allowance for cdn.jsdelivr.net, which is where the
Scalar API-reference viewer's JS is loaded from — the script itself
never ran. Added it to script-src/style-src/font-src/connect-src.
(User-confirmed before applying — widens what's allowed to load, so
wanted explicit sign-off rather than just doing it in response to a
console error.)
New users get a Gravatar-backed avatar automatically (computed from email
at signup); users can upload a custom photo instead via Settings, or
revert to the Gravatar/initials fallback. avatarUrl stays the single
resolved value (custom photo, OAuth photo, or precomputed Gravatar URL)
so every existing avatar-rendering spot across the app needs zero changes.
- users.hasCustomAvatar tracks whether avatarUrl is a real upload vs a
computed Gravatar fallback, so "remove photo" knows what to revert to.
- New /api/v1/upload/avatar-presign route (session-scoped, generic —
the existing recipe-photo presign route required a recipeId).
- CSP img-src needed www.gravatar.com added, or every browser blocks
the fallback avatar outright.
- Settings page now reads avatarUrl from a fresh DB query instead of
Better Auth's session object — the session cookie cache (5 min TTL)
was serving a stale image right after upload, showing the initials
fallback until the cache happened to expire.
Verified locally: signup auto-sets a Gravatar URL, upload persists
across reload, remove correctly reverts to Gravatar/initials.
compose.prod.yml passes STORAGE_PUBLIC_URL through ${STORAGE_PUBLIC_URL}
build args/env — when unset in .env.production, docker-compose
substitutes an empty string, not an absent var. ?? only falls back on
null/undefined, so next.config.ts's `new URL("")` threw and failed the
whole `pnpm --filter web build` step. Switched to || in next.config.ts
and lib/storage.ts so empty string also falls back to the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota
bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work.
Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog.
- AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only
- Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats
redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches
- New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade
- Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation
- Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos)
- Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure
- Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota
- Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root
- middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached
session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches,
bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id
- Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables
- Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions
standardized on AlertDialog
- Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form;
canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and
alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos
- packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire);
openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now
surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Users can rate a recipe with review text and an optional photo. Adds
ratings.photo_key column, a reviews list endpoint, and a review-purpose
presign path (reviewer isn't the recipe owner, so the upload
authorization differs from cover-photo uploads).
Also fixes CSP connect-src/img-src to allow the storage origin —
direct-to-S3/MinIO presigned uploads and stored images were silently
blocked by Content-Security-Policy in the browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add root Dockerfile (standalone Next output, multi-stage pnpm build), drop
in-stack caddy in favor of publishing web's port for an external traefik
LXC (file-provider dynamic config included), and document the portainer
deploy flow.
Also fixes issues that blocked any production build: a bad auth-client
type cast, the ai SDK's mimeType->mediaType rename, an implicit-any
callback param, and push.ts eagerly calling webpush.setVapidDetails at
module import time (which crashed page-data collection whenever VAPID
env vars weren't present at build) — now lazily configured on first send.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Arnaud