3042d289a0
Full list of the audit's confirmed findings and their fixes: - Stored XSS via unescaped JSON-LD on the public recipe page (app/r/[id]/page.tsx) — escape < before injecting. - CSP allowed unsafe-eval in production — now dev-only (Next prod never eval()s; only its HMR does). - avatarUrl accepted any URL with no ownership check — now takes an avatarKey issued by avatar-presign, validated server-side, same pattern as recipe/review photos. - No session revocation on password change/reset — both now revoke other sessions (revokeOtherSessions: true, revokeSessionsOnPasswordReset). - Rate-limit bypass via spoofable X-Forwarded-For — take the last (proxy-appended) hop instead of the first (client-supplied) one, matching the single-Traefik-hop topology. - Webhook signing secrets stored plaintext — now AES-256-GCM encrypted like every other secret in this app, with a legacy- plaintext fallback for pre-existing rows (bare hex has no ":", our ciphertext format always does). - Better Auth's own rate limiter defaulted to in-memory storage, ineffective across replicas — now backed by the same Redis as lib/rate-limit.ts (secondaryStorage), with storeSessionInDatabase explicit so session storage itself doesn't move as a side effect. - Presigned upload URLs didn't bind the declared file size to the actual upload, letting a client under-declare size (and quota charge) then PUT an arbitrarily large object — switched to S3 presigned POST with a signed content-length-range condition, enforced by the storage server itself. - generateMetadata() on the recipe page skipped the visibility filter the page body uses, leaking a private recipe's title via <title> to any signed-in user with the id. - Block/unblock had no rate limit, unlike follow/unfollow. - AI quota was charged even when a user's own BYOK key was used (their own credentials/billing) — added an isByok flag through the config-resolution chain and skip the charge when set. Also wired BYOK into generate/generate-from-idea/translate/import-url, which never looked it up at all before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
89 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
89 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import { getSessionCookie } from "better-auth/cookies";
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import { applyRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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const PUBLIC_PATHS = ["/login", "/signup", "/verify-email", "/verify-2fa", "/forgot-password", "/reset-password", "/api/auth", "/r/", "/u/", "/s/", "/docs", "/api/v1/openapi.json", "/api/webhooks", "/api/v1/invites/", "/api/internal/"];
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const ADMIN_PATHS = ["/admin"];
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// A public-editable shopping list's own items endpoint — no session cookie to
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// require, since an anonymous visitor's only credential is the link (the list
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// id) itself. getShoppingListAccess (lib/shopping-list-access.ts) is what
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// actually enforces that the specific list allows this; a non-public list
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// hitting this route just gets a 404/403 from the handler, same as today.
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const SHOPPING_LIST_ITEMS_RE = /^\/api\/v1\/shopping-lists\/[^/]+\/items(\/|$)/;
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// Unauthenticated, publicly-linked pages/endpoints (shared recipes/shopping
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// lists) — no per-user identity to key on, so rate-limit by IP to deter abuse.
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const IP_RATE_LIMITED_PATHS = ["/r/", "/s/"];
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const IP_RATE_LIMIT = 60;
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const IP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60;
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// Epicure sits behind exactly one reverse proxy (Traefik — see traefik/epicure.yml).
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// Each hop *appends* the address it saw to X-Forwarded-For, so with a single
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// trusted hop in front of us, the rightmost entry is the address Traefik itself
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// observed — i.e. the real client — while anything to its left (including the
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// entire header, on a direct request with no proxy at all) is attacker-supplied
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// and must not be trusted. Taking the leftmost entry, as before, let a client
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// set an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For and get a fresh rate-limit bucket on every
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// request. If another reverse proxy is ever added in front of Traefik, this
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// needs to pop one more entry per added hop.
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function getClientIp(request: NextRequest): string {
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const forwardedFor = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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if (forwardedFor) {
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const parts = forwardedFor.split(",");
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return parts[parts.length - 1]!.trim();
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}
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return request.headers.get("x-real-ip") ?? "unknown";
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}
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export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
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const { pathname } = request.nextUrl;
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const sessionCookie = getSessionCookie(request);
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const isShoppingListItems = SHOPPING_LIST_ITEMS_RE.test(pathname);
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// Only treat the items endpoint as public for requests with no session —
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// an authenticated collaborator's own polling/edits should never be bucketed
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// into the anonymous-visitor IP rate limit below.
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const isPublic = PUBLIC_PATHS.some((p) => pathname.startsWith(p)) || (isShoppingListItems && !sessionCookie);
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const isAdmin = ADMIN_PATHS.some((p) => pathname.startsWith(p));
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const isApi = pathname.startsWith("/api/v1");
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if (isPublic) {
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if (IP_RATE_LIMITED_PATHS.some((p) => pathname.startsWith(p)) || isShoppingListItems) {
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const ip = getClientIp(request);
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const limited = await applyRateLimit(`rl:public:${ip}`, IP_RATE_LIMIT, IP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS);
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if (limited) return limited;
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}
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return NextResponse.next();
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}
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// API-key clients authenticate via `Authorization: Bearer ek_...`, not a
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// session cookie — they'd otherwise be rejected here before ever reaching
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// requireSessionOrApiKey (lib/api-auth.ts), which is the only place that
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// actually verifies the key. Defer to it instead of requiring a cookie.
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const authHeader = request.headers.get("authorization");
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const hasApiKeyHeader = isApi && authHeader?.startsWith("Bearer ek_");
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if (!sessionCookie && !hasApiKeyHeader) {
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if (isApi) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
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}
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return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/login", request.url));
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}
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if (isAdmin) {
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// Role check happens inside admin pages — middleware only checks auth
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// Full role verification requires DB lookup, done server-side in admin layout
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}
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return NextResponse.next();
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}
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export default proxy;
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export const config = {
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matcher: [
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"/((?!_next/static|_next/image|favicon.ico|icon.svg|icon-192.svg|icon-512.svg|manifest.webmanifest|sw.js|public/).*)",
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],
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};
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