Files
Epicure/apps/web/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts
T
Arnaud d2faf98ac1 fix: resolve TODO.md security/perf/test-coverage backlog
Fixes the 13-item codebase health scan backlog: wraps meal-plan
generation in a transaction, adds missing userId/GIN indexes, fixes
an IPv6-parsing gap in the webhook SSRF guard (and an identical
duplicated bug in the AI URL-import path, now consolidated onto one
implementation), paginates the collections list, dedupes the AI
recipe Zod schemas, wires up Stripe tier sync, rate-limits AI key
rotation, gets `pnpm typecheck` actually working, and adds test
coverage for the previously-untested admin/webhooks routes.

Two flagged issues (collection removeRecipeId IDOR, tier-limit race)
turned out to already be fixed/non-issues on inspection — noted in
TODO.md rather than silently dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 12:12:42 +02:00

102 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { db, users, eq } from "@epicure/db";
// Stripe webhook handler — verifies stripe-signature header using HMAC-SHA256.
// Handles:
// - checkout.session.completed → upgrade user to pro
// - customer.subscription.deleted → downgrade user to free
const STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 300; // 5 minutes
function verifyStripeSignature(
rawBody: string,
sigHeader: string,
secret: string
): { valid: boolean; payload: string | null } {
// sigHeader format: "t=<timestamp>,v1=<hmac>[,v1=<hmac>...]"
const parts = sigHeader.split(",");
const tPart = parts.find((p) => p.startsWith("t="));
const v1Parts = parts.filter((p) => p.startsWith("v1="));
if (!tPart || v1Parts.length === 0) {
return { valid: false, payload: null };
}
const timestamp = tPart.slice(2);
const tsNum = parseInt(timestamp, 10);
if (isNaN(tsNum)) return { valid: false, payload: null };
// Reject stale webhooks
const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (Math.abs(nowSec - tsNum) > STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {
return { valid: false, payload: null };
}
const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${rawBody}`;
const expected = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", secret)
.update(signedPayload, "utf8")
.digest();
const matched = v1Parts.some((v1Part) => {
const provided = v1Part.slice(3); // strip "v1="
let providedBuf: Buffer;
try {
providedBuf = Buffer.from(provided, "hex");
} catch {
return false;
}
if (providedBuf.length !== expected.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expected, providedBuf);
});
return { valid: matched, payload: matched ? rawBody : null };
}
export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
const body = await req.text();
const sig = req.headers.get("stripe-signature");
const webhookSecret = process.env["STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET"];
if (!sig || !webhookSecret) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Stripe not configured" }, { status: 400 });
}
const { valid } = verifyStripeSignature(body, sig, webhookSecret);
if (!valid) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid signature" }, { status: 400 });
}
let event: { type: string; data: { object: Record<string, unknown> } };
try {
event = JSON.parse(body) as typeof event;
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 });
}
switch (event.type) {
case "checkout.session.completed": {
// client_reference_id is set to our internal userId when the Checkout Session is created.
const userId = event.data.object["client_reference_id"];
const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
if (typeof userId === "string" && typeof customerId === "string") {
await db.update(users).set({ tier: "pro", stripeCustomerId: customerId }).where(eq(users.id, userId));
}
break;
}
case "customer.subscription.deleted": {
const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
if (typeof customerId === "string") {
await db.update(users).set({ tier: "free" }).where(eq(users.stripeCustomerId, customerId));
}
break;
}
default:
// ignore unhandled event types
break;
}
return NextResponse.json({ received: true });
}