d2faf98ac1
Fixes the 13-item codebase health scan backlog: wraps meal-plan generation in a transaction, adds missing userId/GIN indexes, fixes an IPv6-parsing gap in the webhook SSRF guard (and an identical duplicated bug in the AI URL-import path, now consolidated onto one implementation), paginates the collections list, dedupes the AI recipe Zod schemas, wires up Stripe tier sync, rate-limits AI key rotation, gets `pnpm typecheck` actually working, and adds test coverage for the previously-untested admin/webhooks routes. Two flagged issues (collection removeRecipeId IDOR, tier-limit race) turned out to already be fixed/non-issues on inspection — noted in TODO.md rather than silently dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
124 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import dns from "node:dns/promises";
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import net from "node:net";
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function isPrivateV4(a: number, b: number): boolean {
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if (a === 127) return true;
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if (a === 10) return true;
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if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
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if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
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if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
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if (a >= 224) return true;
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return false;
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}
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/** Expands a valid IPv6 address (any compression form) into 8 16-bit groups as a BigInt. */
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function ipv6ToBigInt(ip: string): bigint | null {
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if (net.isIPv6(ip) !== true) return null;
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const [head, tail] = ip.split("::");
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const headParts = head ? head.split(":") : [];
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const tailParts = tail ? tail.split(":") : [];
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// An embedded IPv4 tail (e.g. "::ffff:127.0.0.1") occupies the last two hextets.
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const expand = (parts: string[]): string[] => {
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const last = parts[parts.length - 1];
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if (last && last.includes(".")) {
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const octets = last.split(".").map(Number);
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if (octets.length !== 4 || octets.some((o) => !Number.isInteger(o) || o < 0 || o > 255)) {
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return [];
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}
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const hex1 = ((octets[0]! << 8) | octets[1]!).toString(16);
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const hex2 = ((octets[2]! << 8) | octets[3]!).toString(16);
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return [...parts.slice(0, -1), hex1, hex2];
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}
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return parts;
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};
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const expandedHead = expand(headParts);
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const expandedTail = expand(tailParts);
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let groups: string[];
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if (ip.includes("::")) {
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const missing = 8 - (expandedHead.length + expandedTail.length);
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if (missing < 0) return null;
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groups = [...expandedHead, ...Array(missing).fill("0"), ...expandedTail];
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} else {
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groups = expandedHead;
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}
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if (groups.length !== 8) return null;
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let result = BigInt(0);
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for (const g of groups) {
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const val = parseInt(g || "0", 16);
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if (Number.isNaN(val)) return null;
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result = (result << BigInt(16)) | BigInt(val);
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}
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return result;
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}
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export function isPrivateAddress(ip: string): boolean {
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const v4 = ip.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
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if (v4) {
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const octets = v4.slice(1, 5).map(Number);
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if (octets.some((o) => o > 255)) return true; // malformed, fail closed
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const [a, b] = octets as [number, number];
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return isPrivateV4(a, b);
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}
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const addr = ipv6ToBigInt(ip);
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if (addr === null) return true; // unparseable, fail closed
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if (addr === BigInt(0) || addr === BigInt(1)) return true; // :: and ::1
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const fc00 = BigInt(0xfc00) << BigInt(112);
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const fe80 = BigInt(0xfe80) << BigInt(112);
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const mask7 = BigInt(0xfe00) << BigInt(112); // /7 mask for fc00::/7 (top 7 bits of the address)
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const mask10 = BigInt(0xffc0) << BigInt(112); // /10 mask for fe80::/10 (top 10 bits of the address)
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if ((addr & mask7) === (fc00 & mask7)) return true; // unique local fc00::/7
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if ((addr & mask10) === (fe80 & mask10)) return true; // link-local fe80::/10
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// IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96
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if (addr >> BigInt(32) === BigInt(0xffff)) {
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const embedded = addr & BigInt(0xffffffff);
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const a = Number((embedded >> BigInt(24)) & BigInt(0xff));
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const b = Number((embedded >> BigInt(16)) & BigInt(0xff));
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return isPrivateV4(a, b);
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}
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* Returns an error string if the URL is disallowed (SSRF), or null if safe.
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* Blocks non-http(s) schemes, RFC-1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata.
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*/
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export async function validateWebhookUrl(rawUrl: string): Promise<string | null> {
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(rawUrl);
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} catch {
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return "Invalid URL";
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}
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if (url.protocol !== "https:" && url.protocol !== "http:") {
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return "Webhook URL must use http or https";
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}
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let addresses: string[];
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try {
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const results = await dns.lookup(url.hostname, { all: true, family: 0 });
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addresses = results.map((r) => r.address);
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} catch {
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return "Unable to resolve webhook hostname";
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}
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for (const addr of addresses) {
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if (isPrivateAddress(addr)) {
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return "Webhook URL must not point to a private or reserved address";
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}
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}
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return null;
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}
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