362f65656b
Full audit (bugs/UI-UX/backend/feature-gap) turned up a money-leak AI quota bypass, webhook SSRF, and a long tail of missing pagination/auth/a11y work. Fixes land together since HANDOFF.md tracked them as one backlog. - AI routes charge tier quota before generating; nutrition POST is author-only - Webhook dispatch re-validates URL per delivery (SSRF/DNS-rebinding), treats redirects as failures; recipe.published now actually dispatches - New indexes/unique constraints on recipes, meal-planning, comments FK cascade - Recipe PUT/restore snapshot only inside the transaction, after validation - Recipe DELETE cleans up S3 objects (recipe + review photos) - Optimistic UI (favorite/star/follow/shopping-list) rolls back on failure - Upload presign enforces file size cap + per-tier storage quota - Route-level loading/error/not-found states across (app), admin, and root - middleware.ts guards (app)/admin; requireAdmin checks DB role, not cached session; rate limiting applied to both session and API-key branches, bucketed per key; Stripe webhook dedupes by event id - Pagination added to recipes, feed, profile, comments, pantry, admin tables - Nav shows real avatar + profile link + dark-mode toggle; destructive actions standardized on AlertDialog - Unsaved-changes guard + real ingredient/step validation on recipe form; canonical /recipes/[id] used in-app; next/image migration; aria-labels and alt text across icon buttons, avatars, recipe photos - packages/api-types removed (zero callers, too drifted to safely rewire); openapi.ts and ai-keys error shape drift fixed; BYOK decrypt failures now surface instead of silently falling back to the platform key Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
120 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
120 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
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import crypto from "node:crypto";
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import { db, users, processedStripeEvents, eq } from "@epicure/db";
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// Stripe webhook handler — verifies stripe-signature header using HMAC-SHA256.
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// Handles:
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// - checkout.session.completed → upgrade user to pro
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// - customer.subscription.deleted → downgrade user to free
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const STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 300; // 5 minutes
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function verifyStripeSignature(
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rawBody: string,
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sigHeader: string,
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secret: string
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): { valid: boolean; payload: string | null } {
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// sigHeader format: "t=<timestamp>,v1=<hmac>[,v1=<hmac>...]"
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const parts = sigHeader.split(",");
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const tPart = parts.find((p) => p.startsWith("t="));
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const v1Parts = parts.filter((p) => p.startsWith("v1="));
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if (!tPart || v1Parts.length === 0) {
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return { valid: false, payload: null };
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}
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const timestamp = tPart.slice(2);
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const tsNum = parseInt(timestamp, 10);
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if (isNaN(tsNum)) return { valid: false, payload: null };
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// Reject stale webhooks
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const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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if (Math.abs(nowSec - tsNum) > STRIPE_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {
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return { valid: false, payload: null };
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}
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const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${rawBody}`;
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const expected = crypto
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.createHmac("sha256", secret)
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.update(signedPayload, "utf8")
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.digest();
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const matched = v1Parts.some((v1Part) => {
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const provided = v1Part.slice(3); // strip "v1="
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let providedBuf: Buffer;
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try {
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providedBuf = Buffer.from(provided, "hex");
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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if (providedBuf.length !== expected.length) return false;
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expected, providedBuf);
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});
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return { valid: matched, payload: matched ? rawBody : null };
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}
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export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
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const body = await req.text();
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const sig = req.headers.get("stripe-signature");
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const webhookSecret = process.env["STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET"];
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if (!sig || !webhookSecret) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Stripe not configured" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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const { valid } = verifyStripeSignature(body, sig, webhookSecret);
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if (!valid) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid signature" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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let event: { id: string; type: string; data: { object: Record<string, unknown> } };
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try {
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event = JSON.parse(body) as typeof event;
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Invalid JSON" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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if (!event.id) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "Missing event id" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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// Dedup: Stripe may redeliver the same event within its retry/tolerance
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// window. Record the event id before processing; if it's already been
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// recorded, skip processing (but still ack with 200 so Stripe stops
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// retrying).
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const [inserted] = await db
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.insert(processedStripeEvents)
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.values({ id: event.id, type: event.type })
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.onConflictDoNothing()
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.returning({ id: processedStripeEvents.id });
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if (!inserted) {
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return NextResponse.json({ received: true, duplicate: true });
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}
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switch (event.type) {
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case "checkout.session.completed": {
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// client_reference_id is set to our internal userId when the Checkout Session is created.
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const userId = event.data.object["client_reference_id"];
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const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
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if (typeof userId === "string" && typeof customerId === "string") {
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await db.update(users).set({ tier: "pro", stripeCustomerId: customerId }).where(eq(users.id, userId));
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}
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break;
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}
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case "customer.subscription.deleted": {
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const customerId = event.data.object["customer"];
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if (typeof customerId === "string") {
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await db.update(users).set({ tier: "free" }).where(eq(users.stripeCustomerId, customerId));
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}
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break;
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}
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default:
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// ignore unhandled event types
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break;
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ received: true });
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}
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