7626f1b496
Security audit fixes (see SECURITY_AUDIT.md): - lib/tiers.ts: checkAndIncrementTierLimit's recipe/storage branches did a live count/sum check with no lock tying it to the later write, so two concurrent requests near the cap could both pass and both write past the limit. Added checkTierLimitInTransaction — holds a per-user Postgres advisory lock for the duration of the caller's transaction, so the check and the write are atomic together. Applied to every recipe/storage write path (recipes create/update, fork, rate, avatar, and 7 AI recipe-creation routes). - Adversarial re-verification of that fix caught a bigger gap in the same area: four AI routes (photo import, idea generation, batch-cook, translate-to-new-draft) had no recipe-limit check at all. Fixed. - Added missing per-user rate limits to 5 AI endpoints (adapt, drinks, pairings, translate, variations) that had none, unlike their siblings. - search page now checks for a session server-side, matching every other page under (app)/ — defense in depth; the underlying API was already public by design and proxy.ts already blocked unauthenticated requests. - admin/settings route now uses the shared requireAdmin instead of a local duplicate. - Documented two admin support-ticket endpoints missing from the OpenAPI spec; verified full route/OpenAPI parity otherwise. - Bumped drizzle-orm to fix a SQL-identifier-escaping CVE, and overrode two transitive deps (esbuild, postcss) with known CVEs. pnpm audit is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
164 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
164 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { db } from "@epicure/db";
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import { tierDefinitions, users, recipes, recipePhotos, ratings } from "@epicure/db";
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import { eq, sql } from "@epicure/db";
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function currentMonth() {
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const now = new Date();
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return `${now.getFullYear()}-${String(now.getMonth() + 1).padStart(2, "0")}`;
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}
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export type LimitKey = "recipe" | "aiCall" | "storage";
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/** Sentinel stored in tier_definitions numeric columns to mean "no cap". */
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export const UNLIMITED = -1;
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export class TierLimitError extends Error {
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constructor(public readonly limit: LimitKey, public readonly tier: string) {
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super(`Tier limit reached: ${limit} (tier: ${tier})`);
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this.name = "TierLimitError";
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}
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}
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/** Either the top-level db client or a transaction handle — both expose the
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* same query-builder surface, so live-derivation helpers and the limit check
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* can run against whichever one the caller is holding a lock in. */
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type DbOrTx = typeof db | Parameters<Parameters<typeof db.transaction>[0]>[0];
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/** Live count of a user's recipes — lifetime total, not a monthly counter. */
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export async function getRecipeCount(userId: string, dbOrTx: DbOrTx = db): Promise<number> {
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const [row] = await dbOrTx
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.select({ n: sql<number>`count(*)::int` })
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.from(recipes)
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.where(eq(recipes.authorId, userId));
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return row?.n ?? 0;
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}
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/** Live sum of a user's storage usage (recipe photos + review photos + avatar) — lifetime total, not a monthly counter. */
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export async function getStorageUsedMb(userId: string, dbOrTx: DbOrTx = db): Promise<number> {
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const [[photoRow], [reviewRow], [userRow]] = await Promise.all([
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dbOrTx
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.select({ total: sql<number>`coalesce(sum(${recipePhotos.sizeMb}), 0)::int` })
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.from(recipePhotos)
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.innerJoin(recipes, eq(recipePhotos.recipeId, recipes.id))
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.where(eq(recipes.authorId, userId)),
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dbOrTx
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.select({ total: sql<number>`coalesce(sum(${ratings.photoSizeMb}), 0)::int` })
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.from(ratings)
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.where(eq(ratings.userId, userId)),
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dbOrTx.select({ avatarSizeMb: users.avatarSizeMb }).from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId)),
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]);
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return (photoRow?.total ?? 0) + (reviewRow?.total ?? 0) + (userRow?.avatarSizeMb ?? 0);
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}
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async function checkLiveLimit(
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dbOrTx: DbOrTx,
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userId: string,
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fallbackTier: "free" | "pro" | "family",
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key: "recipe" | "storage",
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amount: number
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): Promise<void> {
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const [dbUser] = await dbOrTx.select({ tier: users.tier }).from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId));
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const userTier = (dbUser?.tier as "free" | "pro" | "family" | undefined) ?? fallbackTier;
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const [tierDef] = await dbOrTx.select().from(tierDefinitions).where(eq(tierDefinitions.tier, userTier));
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if (!tierDef) throw new TierLimitError(key, userTier);
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const limit = key === "recipe" ? tierDef.maxRecipes : tierDef.storageMb;
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if (limit === UNLIMITED) return;
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const current = key === "recipe" ? await getRecipeCount(userId, dbOrTx) : await getStorageUsedMb(userId, dbOrTx);
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if (current + amount > limit) throw new TierLimitError(key, userTier);
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}
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/**
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* Checks the tier limit for the given key, throwing TierLimitError if it's
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* already been reached (or would be exceeded by `amount`).
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*
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* The caller's `userTier` is never trusted directly — it comes from the
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* session's 5-minute cookieCache (see lib/auth/server.ts), so a just-downgraded
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* user would otherwise keep the old tier's caps for up to 5 minutes. The
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* current tier is always re-read from the DB here.
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*
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* "aiCall" is the only key that's monthly — it atomically checks-and-increments
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* a per-month counter in a single SQL statement to avoid a TOCTOU race.
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* "recipe" and "storage" are lifetime totals derived live from real data
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* (recipes/photos/avatar rows), so they're pure checks with no counter to
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* increment — deleting a recipe/photo/avatar is itself the "decrement".
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*
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* This plain (unlocked) check is a fast pre-flight only — two concurrent
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* calls can both read the pre-write count and both pass. Anywhere the actual
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* write happens in the same request, use checkTierLimitInTransaction instead
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* so the check and the write are atomic together.
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*/
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export async function checkAndIncrementTierLimit(
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userId: string,
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fallbackTier: "free" | "pro" | "family",
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key: "recipe" | "aiCall" | "storage",
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amount = 1
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): Promise<void> {
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if (key === "aiCall") {
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const [dbUser] = await db.select({ tier: users.tier }).from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId));
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const userTier = (dbUser?.tier as "free" | "pro" | "family" | undefined) ?? fallbackTier;
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const [tierDef] = await db.select().from(tierDefinitions).where(eq(tierDefinitions.tier, userTier));
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if (!tierDef) throw new TierLimitError(key, userTier);
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const month = currentMonth();
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const id = `${userId}-${month}`;
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const limit = tierDef.aiCallsPerMonth;
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const cap = limit === UNLIMITED ? sql`true` : sql`user_usage.ai_calls_used < ${limit}`;
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const result = await db.execute(sql`
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INSERT INTO user_usage (id, user_id, month, ai_calls_used)
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VALUES (${id}, ${userId}, ${month}, 1)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id, month) DO UPDATE
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SET ai_calls_used = user_usage.ai_calls_used + 1
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WHERE ${cap}
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RETURNING ai_calls_used
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`);
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if (result.length === 0) {
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throw new TierLimitError("aiCall", userTier);
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}
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return;
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}
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await checkLiveLimit(db, userId, fallbackTier, key, amount);
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}
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/**
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* Same check as checkAndIncrementTierLimit's "recipe"/"storage" branches, but
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* takes a transaction and holds a per-user Postgres advisory lock for its
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* duration — so a concurrent call for the same user blocks until this one
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* commits (or rolls back), instead of racing to read the same pre-write
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* count. The lock auto-releases at transaction end (pg_advisory_xact_lock),
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* so there's no separate unlock step and no risk of a leaked lock.
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*
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* Call this as the first statement inside the same db.transaction that
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* performs the write the check is gating — checking and inserting in
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* different transactions (or different requests, like a presign-time check
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* for a row written later) leaves the same TOCTOU gap this closes.
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*/
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export async function checkTierLimitInTransaction(
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tx: DbOrTx,
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userId: string,
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fallbackTier: "free" | "pro" | "family",
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key: "recipe" | "storage",
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amount = 1
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): Promise<void> {
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await tx.execute(sql`SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(${userId}))`);
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await checkLiveLimit(tx, userId, fallbackTier, key, amount);
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}
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/**
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* Refunds one aiCall credit for the current month. Call this when an AI
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* request failed after the quota was already charged (e.g. provider error)
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* so users aren't billed against their limit for a call that never succeeded.
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*/
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export async function refundAiCall(userId: string): Promise<void> {
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const month = currentMonth();
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await db.execute(sql`
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UPDATE user_usage
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SET ai_calls_used = GREATEST(ai_calls_used - 1, 0)
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WHERE user_id = ${userId} AND month = ${month}
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`);
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}
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